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NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications:
Process, Priorities and Goals
INTRODUCTION
This Background Paper summarizes a one-day workshop convened to assess the
effectiveness of the planning and priority-setting mechanisms used by NASA's Office of
Space Science and Applications (OSSA) in carrying out its diverse scientific program. The
workshop was requested by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and
was structured to provide input to a study by the Committee's Task Force on the Health of
U.S. Research. This examination of the NASA Space Science and Applications program is
one of several case studies by the task force. 1
Workshop participants included a representative group of practicing scientists,
research administrators, and policy analysts who discussed how OSSA sets its goals, plans
its programs, and evaluates progress toward achieving goals and objectives. They also
discussed how OSSA responds to changes in the external environment that require
modification to its ongoing programs and to its long-term strategic planning. In addition,
the workshop deliberations provided insight into current issues of OSSA program
management and of the difficulties facing NASA as it adjusts to an era of fiscal stringency
following a significant five-year expansion of the OSSA budget.
In preparation for the workshop, OTA developed a detailed set of issues pertaining
to OSSA's planning, priority-setting, and performance assessment procedures for purposes
of focusing the workshop discussions. The issues were drafted to meet the general needs of
the broader House Task Force study while reflecting the specific characteristics of OSSA's
scientific program. These issues were discussed by telephone with all of the invited
participants and modified to reflect suggestions for clarifications and additional topics
1 The Task Force is also examining, among others, fusion and mathematics research.
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(App. A). The agenda for the workshop followed the broad groupings of the issues list.
Prior to the workshop, OTA invited each participant to write a short (3 - 5 pages)
response to selected issues. This brief summary of the workshop proceedings incorporates
material from the discussions at the workshop, from the participants' issues papers, and
from the background materials provided to OTA by the Office of Space Science and
Applications. OTA has sought to make this summary useful for those who may not have
detailed specialized knowledge of the programs, plans and organization of NASA's Office
of Space Science and Applications. OTA prepared an initial draft of this paper, which was
then sent to workshop participants and other knowledgeable individuals for review.
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FINDINGS
Finding 1: The OSSA strategic planning process has proved effective in garnering
improved funding for space science projects because it has successfully involved a
broad cross section of the space _ience community in setting science priorities within
the sclenttfic disciplines. Yet, in its planning for future projects, OSSA often fails to
be realistic about probable future budgets. OSSA also needs to find better
mechanisms for containing cost and schedule growth after projects are underway.
OSSA committees, composed of discipline specialists, set scientific priorities for
each discipline OSSA supports. OSSA has used the priority-setting process, in which
proposed projects are closely scrutinized by teams of scientists, to build a strong
constituency for its projects within the Administration and within Congress. As currently
structured, the process is geared to steady increases in funding, but has difficulty
responding to funding decreases. However, the Appropriations Committees' Conference
Report for fiscal year 1992 limits NASA's 1993 funding allocations to increases of no more
than 5 percent, 2 which is much less than the increases OSSA has recently experienced?
Hence, OSSA will have to adjust its planning and priority-setting processes accordingly.
OSSA could improve its priority-setting process by developing improved methods
for establishing priorities across disciplinary boundaries. This will not be easy because it
involves making judgements about the relative value of projects from widely different
fields. A report from the Space Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences on
setting priorities in space research provides some guidance for such an effort? OSSA may
2 "The conferees concur in the Senate language enumerating a sedes of principles designed to adjust
NASA's expectations and strategic planning to leaner budget allocations in the coming years."
Conference Report on the 1992 Appropriations for the Veteran's Administration, Housing and Urban
Development, and Independent Agenclas, House of Repreaentatives Report 102-226 (to accompany H.R.
2519), Sept. 27, 1991, p.54. The Senate language directs that *the agency should assume no more than 5
percent actual growth in fiscal year 1993": Senate Report 102-107, July 11, 1991 (to accompany H.R.
2519), p. 130.
3 OSSA's budget has doubled In real terms since fiscal year 1982.
4 National Academy of Sciences Space Studies Board, Task Group on Priorities in Space Research, Phase
I, Setting Priorities for Space Research: Opportunities and Imperatives (Washington, DC: National
Academy Press, 1992).
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have to develop mechanisms for canceling or drastically reprogramming projects that show
signs of greatly overrunning their budgets, in order to maintain the scientific viability of
other projects in its portfolio.
OSSA may also wish to examine the experience of industry in organizing strategic
planning processes and in managing research and development assets. Although few
industrial methods would be directly applicable to NASA's case, an examination of OSSA's
processes by groups possessing expertise in "work process redesign "5 might prove beneficial
in leading OSSA to new approaches for more effectively managing OSSA's considerable
fiscal and intellectual assets.
Finding 2: The OSSA process could benefit from improved mechanisms to provide more
systematic feedback to OSSA concerning the realism, flexibility, and success of
previous plafis.
Each strategic plan could formally include information regarding the key
assumptions about resources available to OSSA and the amount of flexibility available if
budgets do not meet expectations. However, improvements in OSSA's priority-setting
process and in its management of the space science budget might still be undercut by
instabilities caused by changes in the expected yearly NASA budgets, both within the
?. i -i_ < _ 7
Administration and within Congress.
Because the available budget is such a key factor in the successful conclusion of a
project, Congress may wish to ask an independent institution to examine the historic
impacts on OSSA's program of the annual fluctuations that result from changing
congressional appropriations and from internal NASA rebudgeting. Such a study could
also examine the consequences of launch delays, cost overruns, and under estimates for
spacecraft systems development, and provide guidance for future OSSA planning.
5 Methods used to analyze how a business practice is currently conducted, that also examine the
charactlstlcs of the customers for the output of the process, and determines which steps in the process
add value or not.
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Finding 3: The lack of flight opportunities for science missions is a major impediment to
maintaining high quality space science.
With the limited projected budget increases, more frequent access to space would
require funding more smaller missions. The smaller missions could allow more frequent
access to space for experimenters because they would not take as long as larger, more
expensive missions to execute. They could also be much more effective in training
graduate students because, among other things, they might allow a student to follow a
project through from start to finish. Yet, in the yearly budget process, new starts for small
missions tend to receive as close scrutiny as the large missions. Hence, NASA tends to
expend nearly as much effort on them as on the larger ones. If Congress were to continue
to encourage the proposal of smaller missions, NASA would find it easier to include a
higher proportion of smaller missions in its mix of projects. 6
Finding 4: Multidisciplinary projects, and those which serve both scientific and
engineering goals, face especially difficult hurdles in the competition for funding
within OSSA.
OSSA is responsible for microgravity research. It is also responsible for all of the
research and medical applications to support human presence in space. Both areas of
scientific research are multidisciplinary "laboratory sciences" and both depend upon, and
provide information and other support for, the space shuttle and space station programs.
Yet despite the fact that they serve both research and operational needs, these two
disciplines have difficulty competing with more traditional disciplines such as astronomy
and astrophysics, space physics, and planetary science. If NASA wishes to encourage these
6 In directing that NASA submit a strategic plan to the Senate Commitee on Appropriations, the
Committeedirectedthat the plan "shouldemphasizea mixof small-,medium-,and large-sizedmissions':
SenateCommitteeonAppropriations,Report102-107(toaccompanyH.R.2519), July11, 1991, p. 131.
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two multidisciplinary efforts, it will have to devote more effort to ensuring that they are
adequately funded.
Finding 5: Congressional "earmarking" of funds for specific space science programs and
projects undercuts scientists' efforts to prioritize proposed space science projects, and
adds to the skepticism scientists have developed regarding the authorization and
appropriations processes within Congress.
Congressional earmarking for projects related to space science and space
applications is part of recent trends v in federal funding of science and technology projects.
Several workshop participants expressed dismay about the practice, which they see as
counterproductive, since most earmarked projects have not undergone the intensive
scrutiny of projects that are part of the OSSA priority-setting process.
7 See the-general discussion of the resultsof earmarkingfor science projects in EliotMarshall,"Pork:
Washlngton'sGrowth Industry," Science, vol. 254, pp. 640-61, 1991.
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WORKSHOP SUMMARY
Goal-Setting and Planning Process
OSSA has developed a well-structured process for generating its scientific program
that extends across the whole range of technical disciplines for which the office is
responsible (including astrophysics, earth sciences, planetary exploration, space physics,
microgravity research and life sciences). The OSSA system for establishing goals and
priorities has evolved over the life of NASA s and involves both external scientific advisory
committees (e.g., the Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS)) and internal advisory committees organized under the Space Sciences and
Applications Advisory Committee (SSAAC) of the NASA Advisory Council. OSSA has
established internal advisory groups to resolve scientific and programmatic issues at the
level of sub- disciplines of the major programs. OSSA also maintains working groups of
scientists involved in particular space flight missions. The NAS/SSB generally establishes
long-range strategies for the space science disciplines, while the internal advisory groups
participate more closely with OSSA's near-term programmatic planning, including dealing
with the details of OSSA's annual budget priorities and advising the Associate
Administrator on the conduct of the ongoing program. The SSB also makes retrospective
assessments of the performance of the major space science disciplines in relation to
previously established goals and objectives for the program. 9
The workshop discussed a wide range of issues related to OSSA planning and
priority-setting. In general, the group agreed that the advisory committee process (both
member selection and involvement with OSSA) is effective in representing the interests of
8 For an accountof the early days of selectingspace scienceexperimentsat NASA,seeJohn E. Naugle,
First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments,The NASA History Sedes
(Washington,D.C.: GovernmentPrintingOffice1991).
9 The Space StudiesBoardhas recentlycompleteda set of four suchassessments.(See p. 26).
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those practicing most of the scientific disciplines. However, participants observed that
advisory committees tend to include relatively few younger scientists, that scientists who are
most successful in competing for flight opportunities and grants are those who get picked
for participation, which lends a certain degree of conservatism to these groups. On the
other hand, they also noted that the many OSSA science working groups provide
opportunities for younger investigators to become involved in the process and to establish
reputations at the subdisciplinary levels of the program.
The discussion returned repeatedly to the "diversity" of the OSSA scientific program
in several contexts. One participant remarked that the breadth and diversity of OSSA's
scientific mission is not unlike that of the National Science Foundation. Several
participants also observed that the disciplines vary significantly in the maturity of the
specificfields of study and in terms of the broader national scientific communities in which
space science is embedded. To illustrate: OSSA is essentially the sole Federal supporter
for planetary research, a field that has grown substantially since NASA came into
existence, t° It is also the sole supporter of microgravity research. In contrast, both NASA
and the NSF have significant programs in astronomy and astrophysics. In even greater
contrast, OSSA's life science program is minuscule relative to the overall national effort in
biomedical research. This programmatic diversity and difference in emphasis can have
significant implications for science and mission planning for the various space science
disciplines.
Representatives of both the life science and microgravity programs expressed
concerns that their fields were presented with particularly difficult planning, program, and
funding issues because of the multi-faceted character of these programs, the relatively
incomplete understanding of these programs by representatives of the "traditional" space
10 The abilityto makeobservationsInsituorfromcloseproximity hasrevolutionizedplanetary research.
Asa result,thefieldismuchlargerandhasa muchdifferentcharacterthanithadpdorto 1957whenthe
SovietUnionlaunchedthefirstspacecraftintoorbit.
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science disciplines, and the need to consider a range of engineering issues as well as basic
scientific considerations. For example, the life sciences must support space shuttle
operations and space station planning 11 in addition to carrying out basic and applied
research in space. Microgravity research is not only directed to understanding how fluid
and physical-chemical transport phenomena are influenced by the unique low-gravity
environment of orbiting spacecraft, but also must provide assistance in developing
technologies crucial to operating in space and for industrial applications. Life sciences and
microgravity research are basically "laboratory" sciences that require quite different
protocols for their execution than do the traditional "observational" sciences. The close
coupling of these two disciplines with the operational needs of the space shuttle and space
station programs adds additional complexity to their planning for scientific objectives.
OSSA faces many complex choices in seeking to develop an integrated space science
program across its varied science disciplines. In general, scientists have been reluctant to
attempt to set priorities, within, much less across, fields of science. One participant with
extensive experience in dealing with broad science policy issues commented that he had yet
to encounter a set of systematic scientific criteria for setting priorities for programs across
disciplinary boundaries, or for interdisciplinary research. 12 Yet participants recognized that
each fiscal year OSSA must make priority and funding decisions that chose one area over
another. 13
The discussions noted the difference between "scientific" and "programmatic"
priorities. That is, OSSA must include in its deliberations a much broader set of issues and
concerns beyond scientific merit and must consider such factors as available funding,
11 It w111also have to support space station operations In the future.
12 See National Academy of Sciences Space Studies Board, Setting Priorities for Space Research:
Opportunities and Imperatives, op. cit.
13 One reviewer with experience in the private sector noted that strategic planning within a company Is
focused on the management of assets the company is likely to have at its disposal, whereas within OSSA,
strategic planning is more focused on external marketing. OSSA uses its strategic planning process to
determine how and when to present proposed missions to the Office of Management and Budget and to
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mission costs, technology readiness, possible Congressional interest, and the need to
maintain "vitality" across all of the supported disciplines. Even recognizing the difficulties,
some participants expressed concern that scientific priorities are not given enough weight
in OSSA's current priority-setting process for new missions. A reviewer later commented
that OSSA places undue emphasis on giving each discipline its "turn" for a new start
independent of the comparative merit of the proposed research.
A related issue concerns how OSSA priorities and strategic plans are (or ought to
be) integrated into the broader strategic planning for NASA, for the overall civilian space
program, and for the national science and technology effort as a whole. One participant
asked how closely coupled is priority setting for space science to priority setting for science
funding as a whole? Do the funds allocated to science done in space accurately reflect the
priority within the research enterprise overall? 14 Several participants observed that in
principle it is highly desirable to raise such questions and to seek an integration of space
science priorities first within NASA, and second, within the whole of federally supported
research. Because _NASA has developed no overall strategic plan, the workshop felt that
offering suggestions about how to accomplish such an integration would be premature, t5
OSSA's Annual Strategic Plans
Since 1988, OSSA has published an annual Strategic Plan that covers the full range
of science and applications programs for which the office has responsibility. The OSSA
Strategic Plan is worthy of close inspection for several reasons. First, the plan is unusually
Congress. Hence, the process tends not to be used to control the rate and size of the resources to
different disciplines, as it would in industry. In other words, the mission planning activities within the
disciplines determine the framework and priorities of the strategic #anning process.
14 In fiscal year 1991, for example, NASA was the fourth largest Federal patron of basic research, after the
National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Energy.
15 Congress has asked NASA to submit a strategic plan to Congress concurrently with the fiscal year 1993
budget submission.
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explicit about the criteria, or decision rules, that OSSA will use in establishing priorities in
the actual budgetary implementation of the strategic directions defined in the planning
process (Box A). At the initiation of the strategic planning process in 1988, OSSA's
Associate Administrator made it clear to the division directors who represent the
competing science disciplines that "...if it isn't in the plan, it won't be in the budget. "t6 The
effect of this approach has been to reinforce the importance of lower-level strategic
planning throughout the OSSA organization. Second, OSSA's strategic planning is tightly
coupled with the programming and budgetary cycles that determine what projects are
finally approved as the result of the external budget review process involving the NASA
Administrator, the Office of Management and Budget, and the four Congressional
Committees with cognizance over OSSA programs. The extent of this "coupling" to the
ongoing decision processes of OSSA can be seen in Figure 1. Third, the OSSA Strategic
Plan can be interpreted as an attempt to bring rational decisionmaking to the highly
complex and disorderly resource allocation mdcha_sms of the Federal budgetary process.
As one participant in the OTA workshop expressed it, "Based on the rarity of good strategic
planning and management across government, industry and academia, my guess is that one
is looking at the zenith of strategic planning in government."
16 On the other hand, the presence of a project in the OSSA plan does not necessarily guarantee that it
will be funded.
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Box A. - Decision Rules for OSSA Programs (1989-'91 Strategic Plans)
Ie Complete the ongoing program. Completing the ongoing program always
has the highest priority; resources allocated to those programs already under way
will not he sacrificed or postponed in order to pursue new starts
2. Initiate a major or moderate mission each year. Major missions preserve
and enhance US leadership in key areas of space science and applications, and
we will pursue major missions whenever available resources allow us to do so. If
an assessment of foreseeable expenditures for candiclate missions, over both the
near term and the lifetime of the program, Indicates that our resources do not
permit a major mission, we will seek to pursue a moderate mission
3, Initiate small miss|ons in addition to major or moderate missions.
We endeavor to start a small mlsalon or a small mission program every year, In
conjunction with either a major or moderate mission
4. Move aggressively, but sensibly, to build science instruments for
Space Station Freedom. S S Freedom Initiatives are determined by the pace
and balance of the scientific disciplines Involved, relevance to and compatibility
with Freedom Station capabilities and schedule, and technological maturity of the
initiative. We will move forward systematically to provide a complete set of fully
developed facilities and instrumentation for Space Station Freedom.
e Research base augmentations will be sought whenever they are
warranted. They are determined by the Impact of both the external environment
and other elements of the OSSA program on discipline stability, progress, and
future needs. Provisions for meeting the long-term recluirements for an adequate
scientific work force and assuring access to the scientific data base from past
missions are particularly critical
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Space Science and
Applications, Strateg/c Plan 1991 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and
Space _nl|nistration, 1991)
How did OTA workshop participants assess the annual OSSA strategic plans? One
participant suggested that: the appropriate criteria for making such an assessment should
include: (1) the realism of the plan within the probable available funding and competing
external priorities; (2) the flexibility of the plan to adjust to changes in the environment
Figure 1.--Annual Strategic Planning and Budgeting Cycle
(Winter)
(Fall)
+
(Summer)
(Spring)
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
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external to OSSA (either within NASA or within other parts of the Federal Government);
and (3) the effectiveness of the feedback mechanisms to assure that planning takes account
of what has already happened. This workshop summary touches briefly on each of these
considerations:
o Successes of the OSSA Strategic Plan - How successful is the OSSA plan? Workshop
participants expressed broad agreement that the plans had been instrumental in
increasing the space science budget, which has doubled in real terms since FY1982.
At the same time, they felt that large budgets do not alone assure an effective
program of scientific research. In particular, workshop participants expressed
concerns about the internal balance of the OSSA program with respect to "research
and analysis" and "flight project" support, as well as the balance between large space
flight projects and smaller missions. Some participants particularly decried the
movement toward funding a higher percentage of large-scale, long-duration
missions, with the concomitant shift in the role of science investigators from being
directly involved in instrument design and experimentation toward data analysis and
interpretation. 17 Others, however, viewed this trend as a consequence of increased
maturity and knowledge in several space science fields. This shift was seen as
particularly harmful in its effects on educating future space scientists who now have
fewer opportunities for direct involvement in the design and fabrication of
spacecraft instrumentation, and the development of experiments, is Furthermore,
the larger, more complex spacecraft may favor scientists at NASA centers over those
employed in academic institutions.
17 This shift parallels a similar shift in the science community as a whole. See, for example, Herbert
Friedman, "Big Science vs. Little Science: The Controversy Mounts," Cosmos, vol. 1, no. 1, 1991, pp. 8-
14.
18 The shift to ever-larger projects, with the "piling on' of research objectives, as well as researchers, in
order to strengthen fiscal justification" was also noted in: Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S.
Space Program, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program
(Washington, DC: U.S. Govemment Printing Office, December 1990), p. 26.
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Workshop participants differed in their interpretations of the realism of OSSA's
strategic planning in terms of overall funding expectations. Some considered that
OSSA's past funding expectations have been unrealistic and that the commitment to
so many large-scale missions in recent years was highly risky given the overall
outlook for the Federal budget and the relatively great impact that cost escalation of
large projects would have on the OSSA budget. In addition, large projects often
require large on-going budgets for operations. 19 Other participants took a more
•supportive view of OSSA's approach, suggesting in effect that instituting a more
conservative plan would lead inevitably to fewer resources for OSSA. To
paraphrase one participant, in the real world the predictable outcome of a
"restrained" budget request is a "more-restrained" program.
Several participants challenged OSSA's current stance of giving highest priority
to "completing the ongoing program," on grounds that those projects that vastly
exceed their costs and schedules adversely affect the progress of other OSSA
projects. In their view, such projects should be canceled to enforce cost-discipline
on hardware contractors and project management teams. Other participants noted
the impacts that these actions would have on the affected science teams and the
practical political and other difficulties NASA would face in canceling ongoing large
projects with large "sunk costs. 'a° This discussion reflects the considerable
frustration workshop participants face in dealing with delays caused by problems in
other projects. No one had a dear solution to the dilemma cost overruns cause, but
noted that cancellation must occur relatively early in the program if it is to be
effective in reducing the adverse effects on other projects.
t9 For example, Operating the Hubble space telescope requires about $200 million per year.
20 In this regard, one reviewer noted the "conservative feedback pressure of contractors and their political
support," which tends to keep funded programs In place regardless of cost overruns.
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One participant indicated that he accepted the invitation to the workshop to carry
a single message: "OSSA's planning queue is too long." To state simply his concerns,
and those of other participants, the long planning queue sets up the potential for
waste, not only of scarce financial resources, but also of scientists' time (in preparing
and reviewing proposals). Dragging out projects interminably also lowers the
morale of science investigators and extracts an opportunity cost by distracting them
from seeking other career alternatives. This is especially debilitating if new missions
have a low probability of being implemented. Participants offered no explicit
suggestions of how OSSA should address this specific concern nor of the implicit
problem of whether entire fields or subdisciplines in the program might have to be
abandoned if the prospects for near-term missions become unfavorable.
o Flexibility and Feedback - The recent shifts in the long-term funding assumptions for
NASA and OSSA as a result of the Congressional decisions on the FY1992 budget
present an opportunity to consider both the flexibility implicit in prior-year planning
and budgeting for OSSA and the ability of OSSA's longer-term strategic planning to
accommodate drastic changes in the external environment affecting the space
science program. The material provided for the workshop participants by OSSA
included briefing charts on the outcome of OSSA's August 1991 Woods Hole
Planning Workshop, convened to reconsider the assumptions of the previous three
strategic plans and to develop the basis for the 1992 Strategic Plan (App. B). 21
The Woods Hole Workshop provided an opportunity for selected members of the
scientific community to reassess the fundamental program and planning directions
OSSA had been following during the first three years of strategic planning, zz The
21 The eTA Workshop Chairman and several other participants attended the Woods Hole meeting.
22 The conference was billed as the "First Triennial Review of OSSA Division Strategies and Proposed
Mission Queues."
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workshop also reexamined the structural elements of OSSA's "core" science
program and updated the "decision rules" used to establish priorities across the
OSSA program (Box B). Finally, the workshop made a first cut at developing a
revised set of priorities and a new mission queue. This final objective resulted
directly from reduced expectations for growth of the OSSA budget. As a result of
congressional decisions as reflected in the fiscal year 1992 appropriation, 23 OSSA
revised its long-term budgetary growth assumptions downward from the previous 10
percent real growth to 5 percent real growth beyond FY1992. The outcome of this
process resulted in shifting the emphasis of the strategic plan in the near-term
toward moderate and small missions and in reordering the long-term queue for
more ambitious missions, now relabeled as "Flagship" missions (see App. B).
23 Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Veteran's Administration, Housing and Urban
Development, and Independent Agencies Committees, Appropriations, Report 102-107, July 11, 1991, p.
130.
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Box B. -- Decision Rules for OSSA Programs (Decision Rules Discussed At
Woods Hole for 1992 Strategic Plan)
Recommended Decision Rules
In Priortty Order:.
o Complete the Ongoing Program
o Provide Frequent Access to Space for Each Discipline Through New and
Expanded Programs of "Small Innovative Missions"
o Initiate Mix of "Intermedlate/Moderate Profile" Missions to Ensure a
Continuous and Balanced Stream of Scientific Results
o Initiate "Ragshlp" Missions that Provide Scientific Leadership and have
Broad Public Appeal
o Invest In the Future by increasing the Research Base to Improve Program
Vltallty and by Developing Needed Future Technologles
o Build and Utilize Scientific Instrumentation for Space Station Freedom and
Conduct a Spacelab Flight Program in a Manner Consistent with the
Space Station Freedom Development Schedule
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of Space Science and
Applications, "The Basis for the Plan." Briefing cherts to explain the process and
outcomes of the Space Science and Applications Advisory Committee Strategic
Planning Workshop, Woods Hole, July 29 - August 2, 1991.
The OTA Workshop's discussion of the outcome of the Woods Hole Workshop
raised a number of issues concerning OSSA's planning and its responsiveness to the
changed budgetary environment. One participant who had attended the Woods
Hole meeting noted that it followed from a major shift in external conditions that
required a careful reconsideration of OSSA's overall strategies. Participants in the
OTA Workshop, however, disagreed whether such a basic reorientation of the
program had in fact occurred. One commented that the revised mission queue -
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while reordering and delaying the major missions - appeared fully as ambitious as
the queue it replaced, u Several observers expressed concern over the reordering of
the mission queue and over the means used to establish revised mission priorities
within specific science disciplines. They stressed the point that the revised priorities
were not based on an assessment of "scientific merit" but rather a general
assessment of programmatic and other nonscientific concerns. Others countered
that SSAAC was attempting to assess cross-disciplinary program priorities,
necessitating a broader range of considerations beyond scientific merit. In the latter
view, the "process" at Woods Hole had a successful conclusion.
However, one could argue about particular "outcomes." The only general
conclusions one might readily draw from this discussion were: (1) that OSSA had
initiated a process of consultation with the affected scientific communities in
response to congressional cuts to the President's proposed budget; (2) that
establishing priorities for backing off (e.g., budget, scope, and timetable) from the
previous "growth-oriented" plan is inherently difficult, in part because of the
expectations built up in previous successful planning efforts; (3) that maintaining
"consensus" among OSSA's diverse community will be much more difficult in a
constrained budgetary environment; and (4) that OSSA made a deliberate, yet not
totally convincing, effort to scale back its assumptions regarding budget growth in
formulating its new strategic plan.
Assessment of Process and Program Outcomes
Workshop participants generally agreed that OSSA has an effective process for
involving its diverse communities in goal-setting, strategic planning and priority-setting
24 S_era]i3articipan_als6 commented that the Woods Hole plan dropped the Orbiting Solar Laboratory,
which had been on the pdority list, and added a new misslon - one to the planet Pluto - which had not
been part of the eadler OSSA planning efforts.
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within disparate scientific disciplines. There was a weaker consensus on whether the
overall process is successful and, indeed, on how such success should be measured. To pick
up on the point made in the previous section, the process may be successful in terms of
involving the space science community, but the outcomes in terms of program performance
are much less successful. A recurring theme in many of the participants' discussion was the
perceived past emphasis of OSSA planning on large complex flight projects 2s with the
attendant potential problems of cost overruns, budgetary uncertainties, schedule delays,
and consequent disruptions of other ongoing OSSA activities, including the conduct of
scientific research.
Participants were especially outspoken about the "wasteful" effects of long delayed
flight missions and of NASA's inability to assure access to space on a predictable basis.
The lack of flight opportunities leads to a serious loss of scientific productivity among
researchers who find that their space experiments take a decade or more to accomplish. 26
In the university community, it also impedes the training of graduate students. These
concerns have been pointed out in a number of previous studies. 27 Several participants also
pointed out that as a result of the length of time it takes to complete most NASA science
missions, timely followup of scientific results becomes extremely difficult. In addition,
some of the technologies used in the spacecraft become obsolete before the spacecraft is
able to fly. The delays in the Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Facility (AXAF) and in the
initiation of the Space Infra Red Telescope Facility (SIRTF) were cited as examples of
failures to provide for timely followup to earlier space achievements. _
25 Most of the largeprojectsnowunderdevelopmentdate from initialplanningcarriedout inthe 1970s.
26 Researchers may spend as much as a decade on a project only to have their missioncancelled.
Participantscited the U.S. satellitefor the InternationalSolar Polar Mission(now renamedUlysses)and
the OrbitingSolarLaboratoryas examples.
27 See, for example, NASAAdvisoryCouncil,The Crisis in Space and EarthScience: A Timefor a New
Commitment(Washington,D.C.: NationalAeronauticsandSpace Administration,November1986).
28 These delays are in large part the resultof the sizeand complexityof these spacecraft. Europaand
Japan are able to follow up now with Astro-Aand Roengtensatellites because they are much simpler
spacecraftinlesscostlyprograms.
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Although the discussion of the issue of large projects was never sharply focused,
several participants suggested that this problem might be systemic in the current program
approval process, which places such heavy emphasis on the justification and approval of
"new starts." One participant commented that one of the most satisfying results of the
recent 0SSA strategic planning process was that it had avoided the earlier process of
annual "shoot-outs" among new flight projects vying for approval as OSSA's highest priority
for a new start. In effect, the Associate Administrator and his staff themselves generated a
Strategic Plan on the basis of the highest priority objectives that had risen to the top of
each discipline through the advisory process. However, that same workshop participant
also voiced concern that the "shoot-out" phenomenon returned at Woods Hole, as the
result in part of the constrained future budgets under which the program now has to
operate. Another participant suggested that the tendency toward very large flight projects
derives in part from the approval procedures of OMB and the Congress, which make it
nearly as difficult to obtain approval of a small or moderate mission as to gain approval for
what are now being called flagship opportunities. He described the situation as a "big
mission trap. _ In review, a workshop participant notedthat large missions may be easier to
sell within the Administration and in Congress because they engage a larger group of
interests and so can mobilize greater political support. 29 The OTA workshop neither
reached a strong consensus that this was a correct diagnosis of "the problem" nor made
specific suggestions as to how those incentives that now encourage the initiation of large
missions might be overcome.
The workshop did not distinguish whether the problems of project delays and
inefficiencies result from a failure of the planning process or from ineffective program
• 29 Note, for example, the broad range of Interests represented in the Hubble Space Telescope. See the
discussion in Robert Smith, The Space Telescope (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
19_).
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management and the disruptions caused by instabilities and uncertainties in the annual
budget process. Participants also expressed the view that Congressional
"micromanagement" of NASA's science program and the resulting "fits and starts" were
undesirable; they override or derail stable strategic planning efforts. One reviewer later
suggested that both factors contributed to project delays, and pointed out that a lack of
attention to technology development across the agency may make new spacecraft more
risky and more expensive to develop than they should be. 3° The Woods Hole Planning
Workshop placed highest priority over the next several years on completing the approved
program, providing frequent access to space for each discipline through new and expanded
programs of "small innovative missions," and initiating small and intermediate missions.
Issues, Concerns and Suggestions for Improvements
The workshop canvassed a wide range of issues and concerns about the effectiveness
of the current OSSA program. The following paragraphs highlight a number of the
recurring themes heard in the discussions.
o The OSSA Plan and the Federal Budga Process - There was clearly a concern among
many participants about a perceived "mismatch" or "disjuncture" between the carefully
constructed strategic plans developed for the space science disciplines and the actual
outcomes of the program. Some of these themes have been noted in earlier sections of
this report. The Federal budgeting process is a major source of concern. On the one
hand, scientists are encouraged to pursue a systematic process of developing rational
plans for achieving scientific objectives and to seek better techniques for setting
priorities across scientific disciplines. On the other hand, the current budgeting system
30 The recentproblemsNASAhasexperiencedinbuildingthe GOES-Nextsatellitefor NOAAillustratesthe
negativeeffects of too little attentionto technologydevelopment. NASA had "decidedto forgo normal
design definitionstudiesand move directlyfrom conceptto hardwaredesignand development':James
R. Asker,AviationWeekand Space Technology,July15, 1991, p. 23.
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does not pro_de the long-term funding stability required to carry out efficiently a
program of scientific investigations that must necessarily extend over many years. The
time-frames of OSSA projects may extend to a decade or more. One participant,
reflecting his extensive experience on Capitol Hill, commented wryly that "...the budget
process gets redone every year, but takes three years; each year it is done over; NASA
is not unique." No one suggested that the situation on the budget would improve any
time soon. In fact, the record deficit of fiscal year i992 has underscored the likelihood
o
that funding for the discretionary part of the Federal budget will remain highly
constrained for years.
Earmarking of funds -- A related issue is that of "earmarking" of funds for specific
programs and projects in the appropriations process. Several participants observed
that such practices run counter to Congress's own stated objectives of improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of science programs. Earmarking also tends to foster
cynicism and unhealthy rivalry within and among scientific disciplines, and suggests to
scientists that their efforts to rank the importance of projects go unrecognized. One
observer noted that scientists share in the responsibility for the increases in earmarking
o
of science-related programs by exerting political pressure for their specific projects and
activities, sl
Program Management -- Throughout the workshop, participants reflected on
NASA's program management practices and their effects on the productivity and
effectiveness of the scientific program. As noted previously, one area of great concern
is related to "access to space" and the tendency for space flight missions to be
stretched-out and delayed, r_ One participant observed that he had been involved in
-- -- s _. 7 =
31 For a broader perspectlveof earmarking, see the discussion In U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, OTA-SET-490, Federally Funded Research" Decisions for a Decade (Washington, D.C.i U.S.
Government Pdnting Office, 1991) pp. 86-93. _''
32 This concern was also noted In the report prepared by the NASA Advisory Council: The Crisis in Space
and Earth Science: A Time for a New Commitment (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space
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the program since the 1960's and that he has now adopted the motto "fly before I die."
The concern over stretch-outs is not only related to its effects on the science
productivity of the directly-involved investigators. Of equal concern is what might be
called the "domino effect" in which projects experiencing cost overruns (sometimes
concurrently with budget cuts) cause the schedules of other projects to slip in order to
maintain overall budget ceilings. Scientists are particularly indignant when such effects
extend to reprogramming of funding for data analysis from past and on-going missions
and for ground-based research, which are seen as particularly vulnerable to such
disruptions and sensitive in terms of overall scientific productivity. Although not
explicitly discussed at the workshop, one contributed paper from a university research
administrator (who could not attend but sent comments for the workshop) described a
"portfolio approach" to research management that might be used as one means of
shielding the smaller non-project-related research from the disruptions caused by flight
project overruns. With this approach, the emerging, interdisciplinary, or smaller
projects would not have to compete directly with large-scale projects, but, instead
would be provided for in a separate allocation that is set aside spedfically for them
either as a percentage of the total program or as a dollar level that cannot be raided to
support large programs. 33
o Technical and Program Risks - Some participants expressed concerns that NASA's
program management practices have become more conservative and risk-averse in
recent years. The Challenger accident was cited to explain the shift, but some
participants noted that a desire for "risk-free" approaches has also permeated OSSA's
quality control procedures for projects that do not require "crew-rated" levels of quality
Administration,November1986).
33 See FederallyFunded Research:Dec done for a Decade, op. cit., ch. 5, for a broaderdiscussionof
thisapproach.
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assurance. The implementation of such procedures were described as overly-
bureaucratic, inflexible, and even counterproductive at times. One participant cited
the example of a small satellite project in which individual electronic components were
given detailed laboratory testing but could not be properly tested on a systems level
because of schedule delays and increased costs incurred at the component level. One
participant summed up the general concern very succinctly as follows: "we need to
separate the desire for 'no risk' from the issue of whether present approaches can
deliver it." The workshop offered few specific suggestions on what might be done to
reverse a drift toward more conservative program management, since it is deeply
embedded in the NASA organizational culture. NASA project managers see high
professional risk in making serious technical errors but relatively little reward in saving
time or money in the conduct of a complex and inherently risky project. Several
participants offered the view that shifting toward the launch of smaller, more focused
scientific projects should make project managers somewhat less risk-averse because
there would be less riding on any one mission. One workshop member stressed that
NASA's problems of program/project management are not unique; other Federal
agencies with high technology programs experience similar problems of overpromising,
underperformance, and turmoil resulting from the Federal budget process. Finally, it
was observed that the recommendations of the "Hearth Report "34 on NASA
program/project management still apply and should be heeded.
o Coordination Improvements - Participants raised a number of issues concerning the
need for improved coordination both within OSSA and in the outside organizations
that interact with OSSA. Within OSSA, "interdisciplinary" research faces very difficult
34 Donald P. Hearth, "Notes on Conclusions and Recommendations to Accompany Briefing Charts on
NASA Project Management Study," NASA History Office, 1979; Donald P. Hearth, "Project Management
In NASA: 1980 and Today." In Issues in NASA Program and Project Management, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, Spdng 1991, pp. 5-10.
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hurdles when it crosses OSSA divisions (there is a tendency for one division to
hope/expect that the other one will provide for the effort). The same is true for
disciplinary research that does not fit within the traditional space science disciplines
(e.g., the Gravity-Probe B project_). Also cited was a concern over the efficacy of
coordination on technology development issues between OSSA and the Office of
Aeronautics and Space Technology; _ similar concerns were expressed with respect to
the coordination (and potential for duplication) with the Office of Commercial
Programs. Also mentioned were the difficulties in coordinating programs between
OSSA and other Federal agencies (especially NOAA); it was noted that such problems
have counterparts in the budget-examining divisions at OMB and in the various
Committees of the Congress. The workshop made no concrete suggestions for
overcoming these difficult and persistent issues affecting programs that cross
organizational boundaries.
o The Life Sciences Program -- One reviewer suggested that placing most life sciences
research in the Office of Exploration rather than in OSSA, as recommended by the
Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, _ would remove it from
competition with other space science projects and might improve its chances for
funding. The Advisory Committee Report argues that because solving the practical
issues of supporting human life in space will be crucial to successful long-term human
spaceflight, it would fare better in the Office of Exploration. On the other hand, the
Office of Exploration might not be well-equipped to treat the basic science aspects of
the life sciences.
35 For a description of this project, see Ann Gibbons, "Putting Einstein to the Test-in Space," Science, voi.
254, Nov. 15, 1991, pp. 239-41.
36 One reviewer pointed out that OSSA was aware of the problem and had taken steps to Improve
coordination.
37 Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, Report of the Advisory Committee on
the Future of the U.S. Space Program (Washington, DC: U.S. Govemment Printing Office, December
1990), p. 32.
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o Retrospective Evaluations -- One workshop member suggested that the planning
process could be improved ff OSSA encouraged formalized retrospective evaluations
of the results of previous plans. More "hard data" for participating scientists on how
well previous plans have fared would at a minimum provide a more informed basis for
debates on the content and internal balance of future OSSA strategic plans. The use of
such feedback mechanisms would inject more realism and flexibility in OSSA's
strategic planning. 38 OSSA could contract with an independent institution for the
collection and analysis of retrospective data, and the preparation of a report.
Space Studies Board Assessments
Although they were not explicitly discussed at the OTA Workshop, we briefly note
the contents of four "assessment" reports on space research activities prepared at the
request of the Chairman of the Space Studies Board of the National Research Council.
These reports are highly relevant to the work of the House Task Force on the Health of
Research. The reports focus on solar and space physics, solar system exploration, space
biology and medicine and satellite earth observations -- four major components of the
OSSA program. _ OSSA's Astrophysics program was not addressed in the series because it
had recently been reviewed by the National Research Council's Astronomy and
Astrophysics Survey Committee. 4° Microgravity research was also not reviewed because
the Space Studies Board is currently developing a research strategy for this discipline.
38 SeeFederallyFundedResearch:Decisionsfor a Decade, op. cit.,ch. 8, for the generalneed to provide
suchdata for federallyfunded research.
39 National Academy of Sciences Space StudiesBoard,Assessmentof Programsin Solar and Space
Physics 1991; Assessment of Solar System E)cpiorationPrograms 1991; Assessmentof ProgramsIn
Space Biology and Medicine 1991; and Assessment of Satellite Earth Observation Programs 1991
(Washington,DC: NationalAcademyPress,1991).
40 NationalResearchCouncil,TheDecade of DiscoveryInAstronomyandAstrophysics (Washington, DC:
NationalAcademy Press,1991).
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These reports, completed during 1991, were undertaken in order to assess the
current status of each of the major space research disciplines and to "review the responses
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and other relevant Federal agencies
to the Board's past recommendations." The reports provide additional information for the
assessment of OSSA's priority setting process. Other government-sponsored research
programs might benefit from similar independent assessments at periodic intervals. The
very existence of such reports says a great deal about the seriousness with which the space
research community addresses the major issues of goal-setting, strategic planning and
program effectiveness.
Summing Up
The procedures and institutional arrangements that OSSA uses to set goals, review
progress, and establish scientific and programmatic priorities are in many ways exemplary;
other agencies could benefit from emulating them. It is particularly notable how deeply the
OSSA \internal advisory committees are involved in the ongoing management
deliberations on agency programs and budgets. OSSA has also been highly sensitive to
recent changes in what NASA might expect in terms of budget support, as reflected in the
Woods Hole planning workshop of this past summer.
Good planning and priority systems within OSSA are, however, no guarantee of
ultimate program success. The existing planning process has been based on what some
workshop participants term "success-oriented planning," i.e., planning that assumes the
ability to complete projects at a faster rate than likely, given previous experience. Planning
must anticipate the uncertainties of future OSSA budgets, available launch opportunities,
and expected stretch-outs of large projects. 4t Thus, OSSA's priority-setting process has not
41 See Eliot Marshall, "X-Ray Astronomy: The Onkindest Cut," Science, vol. 254, pp. 508-510, for an
account of some of the uncertainties space scientists experience in completing a large project.
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guaranteed overall success within NASA. At the same time thai the process has been
successful in garnering increased funding for OSSA's programs, it has raised expectations
among project scientists that cannot be fulfilled. Participants in the OTA workshop were
generally concerned about the future health of OSSA. The missions now in the queue as a
result of the Woods Hole workshop require greater growth in the OSSA budget than
workshop participants felt was feasible given the extraordinary pressures on the
discretionary portion of the Federal budget. 42
The recent stresses from the budget, and the high expectations of OSSA's diverse
science communities based on previous OSSA strategic planning and funding successes,
will continue to present a major challenge to OSSA's managerial and intellectual resources.
Future efforts should consider how to make the planning process more resilient, and how
to enable it to take sufficient account of the variety of pressures on NASA's budget and
other internal and external priorities. 43
Several members of the workshop, as well as outside reviewers, also commented on
the fact that good planning ultimately depends on the assumption of follow-through on the
budget after Congress approves a new start. Budget stability is a very important
component of the process. One reviewer pointed out that the annual budget fluctuations
that occur in response to changing congressional appropriations or to internal NASA
rebudgeting are likely to have a major effect on the efficacy of OSSA's planning. The
reviewer suggested that a detailed study of these effects over the last decade of OSSA plans
could provide valuable insights for the Task Force.
Because this workshop was convened to assess the OSSA planning process, it gave
very little attention to international efforts in space science. Yet what other countries have
42 Yet several reviewers noted that it was difficult to make significant changes In the outcomes of the
process because of the entrenched Interests within the scientific disciplines, which tend to be well-
organized and which have a relatively sophisticated understanding of the federal political process_
43 One participant, commenting later, wondered whether space scientists really had the will to change the
system, given that they have largely benefitt_ from the process as it stands.
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already accomplished in space science and their future plans affect the U.S. planning
process, if only indirectly. In particular, political considerations, inherent in many
international cooperative projects, may skew the science priorities and either cause a
project to be continued despite a relatively low scientific ranking, or to be canceled even
though it ranks high scientifically. Constrained budgets for space science have led to an
increasing interest in greater international cooperation on a variety of space science
projects. How foreign space science projects and cooperative projects affect OSSA
planning should therefore be given full attention.

Appendix A. -- Assessment Issues
Workshop on NASA's Office of Space Science and Applications:
Process, Priorities and Goals
eTA developed the following set of broad issues in order to help workshop participants focus on
process, plans, outcomes, and possible improvements. Although the Issues are broadly stated, the
discussion of them necessarily focused on specific examples.
Goal-Setting and Planning Process
The Task Force is particularly interested in how OSSA establishes its long-term goals and
objectives, and the process by which OSSA assesses the current state of knowledge (and technology) with
respect to future space missions and the potential contributions of these activities to the advancement of
knowledge. It is also interested in how the results of the process are circulated among the communities
and how frequently the assessments are made.
o
o
,
.
°
°
How are participants in the planning process selected? Are they representative of the scientific and
technical disciplines Involved? Is the process an open one In the sense that young investigators
and emerging fields of science are provided an opportunity to compete for resources and priority
with established activities and investigators?
To what extent are long-term goals and objectives driven by basic scientific Issues and the state of
knowledge in particular fields and disciplines? To what extent do extra-scientific Issues and
considerations affect the overall scope and direction of the program?
How do the above considerations vary across the diverse scientific disciplines that comprise the
space science program (e.g., astrophysics, planetary exploration, space physics, earth science,
microgravity)? Do all disciplines within OSSA have a structured planning process and published
long-term scientific strategies? (Cite examples of particularly good or weak areas.)
How are cross-disciplinary priorities and Issues addressed in establishing the overall direction of
the space science program? How effectively do emerging disciplines and smaller scientific
communities (e.g., microgravtty, life sciences) compete with more established traditional space
science activities (e.g., planetary, astrophysics, space physics)?
How effectively are results (and failures) of previous space missions and investigations factored
into the overall scientific and project planning for the program? Are "lessons leamed" applied in
practice?
Does the planning process for space research take adequate account of scientific and technical
progress In other fields (e.g., space astrophysics vs. ground-based astronomy)?
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Annual OSSA Strategic Plan
Since 1988, OSSA has published an annual Strategic Plan that covers the full range of science and
applications programs for which the office has responsibility. The Committee is interested in the views of
the scientific community outside NASA toward this process:
,
°
.
10.
11.
How successful is the OSSA strategic plan? How successful has it been In gaining support for
OSSA programs from the funding entities (OMB and the Congress) and the broader public
Interested in the space program?
Does the strategic plan grapple with the real issues facing the space science program? How
successful has it been in dealing with the difficult tradeoffs forced by budget constraints and the
competing claims of OSSA's diverse science disciplines?
Does the plan provide outside observers with adequate insight into the basis for the agency's
decisions on program priorities and funding allocations? Is the process reported in the plan
perceived by OSSA's scientific constituencies as being fair and even-handed?
Is the priority-setting process (especially the setof decision rules, pp. 16 and 21 of the 1991 plan)
perceived as being rational and appropriate to the selection of project new starts? For establishing
the funding balance between ongoing efforts and new initiatives? Between "big science" and *little
science"?.
Does the OSSA plan reflect an appropriate awareness of the external concerns and interests of the
Congress and the Administration, Including the broader national agenda? Is the OSSA planning
process resilient in responding to changes in the extemal environment (e.g., the recent major shift
in long-term funding assumptions resulting from the budget agreement and Congressional funding
guidei|nes t0-NASA)?
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Program Outcomes
12. How well has OSSA succeeded in actually meeting the goals and objectives set for its programs
by the scientific community and by Administration and Congressional policies? What are
appropriate measures for success?
13. By what means does the broader scientific community assess the effectiveness of OSSA
programs? Do these assessments become factored into the decision-making process on future
planning and budgets? Is there there adequate "feedback" mechanisms?
14. Is the OSSA program as it currently exists appropriately "balanced" across disciplines and types of
activities Involved in the program?
15. Will major shifts in the OSSA program planning process be required to meet the constraints of
more stringent funding guidelines now being addressed for NASA?
Suggestions for Improvements
16.
17.
What changes might improve the effectiveness of the planning and program Implementation
processes used by NASA in its management of the space science program?
Are there substantive changes in program directions that would lead to more effective utilization of
available resources for the conduct of the OSSA program'{

Appendix B.--Results of the Woodshole Strategic Planning Workshop,
July 29 - August 2, 1991
Table L-Recommended Integrated Queue for Intermediate/Moderate Profile and
Flagship Missions
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Thermosphere Ionosphere Mesosphere Energeties and Dynamics
(TIMED)- Intermediate
High Energy Solar Physics (HESP) - Intermediate;
Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTIF) - Flagship
Pluto Flyby or Neptune Orbiter (PF/NO) - Flagship
Inner-Magnetosphere Imager (IMI) - Intermediate
Mars Environmental Survey (MESUR) - Moderately Paced;
Grand Tour Cluster (GTC) - Intermediate
Orbiting Solar Laborato_ (OSL) - Flagship
Sub-Millimeter Intermediate Mission (SMIM) - Intermediate
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Adminstration, 1991
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Table 2..-Recommended Implementation Process
O
0
O
Initiate the following year-by-year sequence identified in the queue. Do not
move to next year until all missions in current year are approved.
For year with more than one mission opportunity, missions are listed in
priority order
The readiness assessment of the Non-Advocacy Review Board should be a
key element in the process of readying missions of new starts at least by the
year noted. All missions must be rigorously cost-controlled so that they do
not exceed boundaries of original structural element.
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1991.
Appendix B B-3
Table 3.--Core Science Program .. New Activity
Research&
Technology
Enhancements
94 TOPS-O-
_6 SOFIA
R&A Enhancements
Smalll_ssbns:
FrequentAccesstoSpace
94 Explorer
Augmentation
96 Discovery'
[98LunarScoul]
[98 Integral]
i
Intermediate J RagshfpMis.don=
]_ : LeadershipIn$I_c4J
|
1994 TIMED
• 1995 HESP
SIRTF
1996 PFor NO
M
1997 MESUR
GTC
1998 OSL
..
SMIM
Utilizationol
Space Station
Ule SctCentriluge
[] PendingFurtherDiscussionby SSAACinNovember1991
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Adminstration, 1991 .
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